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STRENGHTENING NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE WITHIN 
PUBLIC COMPANY NUCLEAR FACILITIES OF SERBIA 
Miloš MLADENOVIĆ, Dalibor ARBUTINA, Svetlana MILANOVIĆ  
Public Company “Nuclear Facilities of Serbia”, Vinča, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia, 
milos.mladenovic@nuklearniobjekti.rs 
 
ABSTRACT 
Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia (hereinafter PC NFS) is the only nuclear 
operator in Serbia. It was founded in 2009 under the Law on Ionizing Radiation 
together with the Serbian Regulatory Body. In autumn 2015, PC NFS has signed 
research agreement with IAEA under CRP on Development of Nuclear Security Culture 
Enhancement Solutions (NSCES) with the duration of three years with possibility to 
extend. Paper covers the results of the first year work on the project in the field of 
implementation of self-assessment methodology developed by the IAEA as well as the 
first half of the second year.  
 
1.  BACKGROUND AND GOAL OF THE WORK 
Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia (hereinafter PC NFS) is the only nuclear 
operator in Serbia. It was founded in 2009 under the Law on Ionizing Radiation together 
with the Serbian Regulatory Body. Since its establishment, PC NFS has continued all 
nuclear activities previously managed by Vinča Institute of Nuclear Sciences; Two 
research reactors (RA-final shut down and RB- zero-power critical assembly, operational 
but currently not-licensed), RWM facilities- old Hangars H1 and H2 with legacy waste, 
new hangar H3 (for the storage of intermediate and low level radioactive waste) together 
with the secure storage for the high activity sealed radioactive sources, waste processing 
facility(WPF) and closed uranium mine Kalna are the parts of the Company.  
In autumn 2015, PC NFS has signed research agreement with IAEA under CRP on 
Development of Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Solutions (NSCES) with 
following research objectives and anticipated outcomes: adoption on nuclear security 
objectives; defining the key actions that contributes to the strong nuclear security culture; 
presenting the responsibilities and roles of state, regulatory body, management and 
individuals in strengthening the nuclear security culture to our employees; establishing 
system with clear roles, objectives and responsibilities; communicate across 
organizational boundaries, integrated management system as a common principle for 
safety and security at all levels, with proper coordination and cooperation, with a result in 
optimum protection.  
The 1
st
 year results were first time shown at International Conference on Nuclear 
Security: Commitments and Actions, Vienna, Austria; 5-9 December 2016 where we have 
presented the results of the first self-assessment survey which has covered almost all of 
our employees (both security and non-security staff). Obtained results gave us the 
broader picture about the zero-point status of nuclear security culture and were the input 
for the interview phase- both group and individual where our psychologist (member of 
our expert team for monitoring the implementation of nuclear security culture (in charge 
for the development and application of self-assessment methodologies)) played the key 
role. 
XXIX	Симпозијум	ДЗЗСЦГ	
 
414 
 
2.  PREPARATION ACTIVITIES 
What is nuclear security culture? What makes strong nuclear security culture and how 
to measure it? In [2], the IAEA says: 
An effective nuclear security culture depends on proper planning, training, awareness, 
operations and maintenance as well as on the thoughts and actions of people who plan, 
operate and maintain nuclear security systems. An organization may be technical 
competent while remaining vulnerable if it discounts the role of the human factor. Thus, 
the human factor (including the upper tier of managers and leaders) is important to 
effective nuclear security. 
Before the first self-assessment survey (which was followed with the pre-survey in 
order to receive the zero-point status) we had a lot of activities at the management level 
in order to prepare our staff: 
• Revision of the procedures related to the nuclear security by in house experts (not 
only the staff with main responsibilities in nuclear security); 
• Establishing the monitoring system for the compliance of the procedures (both 
safety and security); 
• Engagement of staff in the process: preparation, inclusion, communication, 
clarification; 
• Director of PC NFS, leading experts in the field of radiation safety and radiation and 
nuclear security has become Certified Nuclear Security Professionals (CNSP) with 
different specializations; 
• Clarifying accountabilities between departments and looking for the accountabilities 
of all departments with nuclear security; 
• Director of PC NFS has formed the expert team for monitoring the implementation 
of nuclear security culture (in charge for the development and application of 
self-assessment methodologies); 
• Team is made from the Committee for radiation and nuclear safety and security+ 
psychologist, Head of the Department for Radiation Safety, Head of Department for 
Development and Application of Nuclear Technologies-eight people together; 
During the preparation activities in order to prepare surveys we had in mind key 
considerations: message given to employees, assurance of anonymity, how the results 
will be used, survey methods and timelines. 
 
3.  PRE-SURVEY 
Before the first self-assessment survey PC NFS expert team has provided two statement 
task for all staff: 
• How would you describe nuclear security system in the PC NFS? 
• How would you describe nuclear security culture in the PC NFS? 
The expert team has provided about 100 questioners and received 75 feedbacks. All the 
staff was grouped by age (<40, 41-53, 54-65), education (high school, BSc and higher) 
and work position (security and non-security).  
20 people with BSc and higher education has provided the answers to the first statement 
which was the same or close to the definition (14 of them was not the security staff). 
Only 10% of the staff was not sure how to classify their work position (security or non- 
security). 
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4.  FIRST SELF-ASSESSMENT (PREPARATION, RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION) 
Our first self- assessment survey had 17 statements in total (management system-6, 
leadership behavior-8, personnel behavior-3) and the 7-point scale (from strongly agree 
to strongly dissagre): 
1.  Nuclear security is a clearly recognized value in our organization.  
2.  The organization has clearly defined and documented roles and responsibilities for 
all nuclear security positions. 
3. Individuals’ expertise and special skills relevant to security are recognized, used and 
rewarded by the organization, regardless of their formal standing within the 
organization. 
4. Staff members at all levels are encouraged to report problems and make suggestions 
for improving performance of the nuclear security system. 
5. When an error or event occurs, the question asked is ‘What went wrong?’ not ‘Who 
was wrong?’ with the focus on improvement, not blame. 
6. Contingency plans are in place to address the defined threats and responses. 
7. Leaders do not abuse their authority to circumvent security. 
8. Managers hold people accountable for their behaviour. 
9. Managers help to build trust and promote teamwork within the organization. 
10. I am actively involved in identification,planning and improvement of 
security-related work and work practices. 
11. For me, security procedures are not regarded as an excessive burden. 
12. When I participate in security training it is given a high priority and is not disrupted 
by non-urgent activities. 
13. I am aware of the systems of rewards and sanctions relating to nuclear security. 
14 I take professional pride in my work. 
15. I get help from my colleagues when I need it and they interact with professional 
courtesy and respect. 
16. I avoid shortcuts in implementing security procedures.  
17. I know that survey is one of the ways of self-assessment and that it is important part 
for security culture. 
The expert team has provided around 100 questioners and received 93 feedbacks. All 
feedbacks were taken into account for the analysis. The sample structure was the same 
as it was for the pre-survey (age, education, position). Figure 1. and Table 1. shows the 
average results for all the categories and average results for all the 
statements-respectively: 
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Figure 1. Average results for all the categories 
 
Table 1. Average results for all the statements 
 
 Statement/Average 
Management 
System 
1 
4.46 
2 
4.22 
11 
5.91 
12 
5.02 
6 
4.63 
17 
5.59 
  
Leadership 
Behavior 
3 
3.38 
4 
3.91 
5   
3.76 
7 
4.46 
8 
4.87 
9 
3.94 
10  
3.37 
13 
3.83 
Personnel 
Behavior 
14  
5.51 
15  
5.30 
16 
4.83 
     
 
All the statements with the average values under 4 were analyzed in much more details. 
Staff on the positions related to the security was much more critical (value 7 was very 
rare). Non-security staff didn’t provide low values (1, 2 and 3) on most of the 
statements. 
It is a very positive sign that the average value of the statements related to the 
management system is 4.97 (close to the border between yellow-green) and we need to 
point out that the best average results were on the statements related to this. This means 
that we need minor adjustments, and we will continue with intensive efforts in this field. 
In the field of leadership behaviour, motivation is part of the framework where we 
should do much more. Also, we need to improve communication between staff and 
management by involving the staff in all aspects of preparing, organizing and carrying 
out operations. For staff who work in the field of nuclear security we have seen more 
critical assessment of the provided questions. This trend was expected because the 
survey content was much more appropriate to their field of work and the larger 
experience that requires critical review. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
PC NFS has clearly defined zero-point status in the field of nuclear security culture. We 
will continue our work by preparing new trainings (in order to educate our staff, both 
security and non-security) which will be held by internal experts and in cooperation 
with other institutions like IAEA and US DoE (up to date, we have organized four 
workshops from different nuclear security fields for our staff as well as for the 
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representatives from all relevant institutions). Nuclear security is clearly recognized in a 
PC NFS strategic plan and it is given same priority as safety (Department for nuclear 
security was formed in the summer of 2016), and nuclear security culture is recognized 
as the foundation of nuclear security system. All the interview questions were adopted 
by the expert team for monitoring the implementation of nuclear security culture and we 
expect to prepare complete analysys before October 2017. After we finish with the 
interview process, our first self-assessment will be complete.  
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SADRŽAJ 
Javno Preduzeće „Nuklearni objekti Srbije“ (u nastavku JP NoS) je jedini nuklearni 
operator u Republici Srbiji. Osnovano je 2009. godine zajedno sa Agencijom za zaštitu 
od jonizujućih zračenja i nuklearnu sigurnost Srbije. U jesen 2015. godine, JP je 
potpisalo istraživački sporazum sa MAAE o okviru koordinisanog istraživačkog 
projekta: Development of Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Solutions (NSCES) u 
trajanju od tri godine, sa mogućnošću nastavka. Rad pokriva rezultate rada u prvoj 
godini trajanja projekta na polju implementacije metoda samo-procene koju je razvila 
MAAE u cilju jačanja nuklearne bezbednosne kulture (rezultati su prvi put prezentovani 
na Konferenciji iz nuklearne bezbednosti organizovane od strane MAAE u decembru 
2016. godine) kao i rezultatima iz prve polovine druge godine trajanja projekta. 
